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Freer Expression or Greater Repression?
UNESCO and the Licensing of
Journalists
by KAREN D. KRAEMER*
I
Introduction
The current state of political unrest in many regions of the
globe presents physical dangers to foreign correspondents. The
threats, ranging from detention and deportation to imprison-
ment and death, not only violate human rights but impinge on
the press's, and hence the public's, access to information.
There is an emerging body of human rights law, as well as an
increasing number of nongovernmental organizations,' that can
be called upon to place pressure on governments practicing or
allowing gross violations of human rights. These mechanisms,
affecting the internal conditions of states, represent a tremen-
dous step forward in the worldwide protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms. Included among the enumerated
"human rights" is "freedom of expression. '2 However, the ex-
isting methods for policing human rights violations have
* J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 1984; Member New York State Bar.
1. This threat of violence and expulsion has witnessed the creation of several
independent press organizations, such as the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press and the World Press Freedom Committee, both of which are based in Wash-
ington D.C. These groups represent all shades of the U.S. political spectrum but share
the common goal of improving the "freedom of the press" and the flow of news
throughout the world. One such organization, the Committee to Protect Journalists,
sponsored a "fact-finding mission" to Latin America in March 1982. The group, which
was comprised of U.S. reporters and editors, issued a statement saying that in El Sal-
vador "the problem of protecting the physical security of journalists ... has become
an international scandal." They cited the killings of Dutch journalists two years ago
in El Salvador as "part of a larger pattern of intimidation of journalists that has chil-
led the newsgathering process." N.Y. Times, July 18, 1982, at A4, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Apr. 2, 1982, at 2, col. 6; 1 CPJ UPDATE 1, 6, 8 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) art. 19,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in Human Rights: A Compilation of Interna-
tional Instruments of the United Nations 2, U.N. Sales No. E.73.XIV.2 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Universal Declaration].
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proven problematic with regard to promoting press access and
freedom of expression; they take time, rely on scrutiny by al-
ready overburdened nongovernmental organizations, cannot in-
sure the rights of any particular individuals, and go into effect
only after the fact. The United States government, acting
alone, can do little to rectify this situation because there are
limits on the legal remedies open to a government when one of
its citizens voluntarily enters the territory of a foreign sover-
eign state.' If the safety and security of journalists is vital to
their access to, and reporting of, the news, then it would seem
that new methods for enhancing press safety would be emi-
nently desirable.
In 1981, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) began to examine the possibility
of issuing "identity cards" to journalists.4 Theoretically, such a
program, if enacted, would help to insure the safe conduct of
journalists throughout the world. The proposal itself was
raised not just in response to the problem of violence against
journalists, but as an element in the establishment of a "New
World Information Order," by which the Third World seeks to
alter what it perceives as biased and distorted news caused by
Western domination of the international press.
Members of the Western press 7 objected to the proposal, call-
ing it a method of "licensing" the press.8 Further, they asserted
that this "licensing" would be in violation of an established in-
ternational doctrine encouraging the "free flow" of information
3. For a discussion of territorial jurisdiction and the territorial integrity of sover-
eign states under traditional rules of international law, see S.S "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. No. 9.
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, at 11, col. 1.
5. Id.
6. A thorough discussion of the "New World Information Order" is beyond the
scope of this commentary. For a more in-depth analysis of the topic, see generally
Theberge, U.N.E.S.C.O.'s "New World Information Order": Colliding With First
Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A.J. 714 (1981); Masmoudi, The World Information Or-
der, J. COM., Spring 1979, at 172. See also Note, A New International Information
Order. The Developing World and the Free Flow of Information Controversy, 8 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. 249 (1980).
7. Throughout this commentary the term "Western press" will be used in refer-
ence to newspapers, radio and television news bureaus and news agencies based in the
United States and Western Europe that comprise the "nongovernmentally controlled
press" or "free press."
8. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1981, at A14, col. 1 (including the complete text of the
Declaration of Talloires, a joint declaration issued by a group of 60 Western press
organizations from 20 countries). See also N.Y. Times, May 18, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
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throughout the globe, irrespective of national boundaries.9
These perceived threats to a free global press were allegedly
among the primary motivations behind the Reagan Adminis-
tration's withdrawal from UNESCO. 10
Regardless of the various motives underlying the UNESCO
proposal, the question still remains whether such a program is
a viable and desirable step toward solving the problem of anti-
press violence.
In order to determine whether an identity card system like
the one proposed by UNESCO would be legally viable, this
commentary first seeks to ascertain whether there are legal
protections constituting a "freedom of the press" at the interna-
tional level. In its examination of international legal docu-
ments, this commentary focuses on particular provisions
regarding freedom of expression by analyzing their legislative
history, the intent and interpretation of the various signatory
states,,and the extent and applicability of any limiting clauses.
This critique is aimed at determining whether the licensing of
journalists would violate the wording or the spirit of these in-
ternational documents. This commentary also discusses
whether the freedom of expression doctrine has emerged as a
custom that is accepted as law and adhered to by nations.
Second, this commentary examines the extent to which the
United States Supreme Court has recognized a right of press
access and newsgathering, in order to determine whether the
United States would be acting in violation of the first amend-
ment if it were to become party to such a "licensing" scheme.
Finally, this commentary concludes that although the licensing
proposal falls short of violating the "letter" of either interna-
tional or domestic law, it is neither a viable nor a desirable solu-
tion to the epidemic of violence against foreign correspondents,
and therefore, alternative solutions must be explored.
9. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1981, at Al, col. 1. The history of the concept of a global
"free flow of information" is discussed infru notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
10. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1983, at Al, col. 3. After a one-year notice period, the
United States has completely withdrawn from UNESCO, effective December 31, 1984.





Violence Against Journalists-Barring Access to
the News and Impeding the Flow of
Information
A. The Problem
Foreign correspondents are no strangers to physical violence.
Yet, while the term "foreign correspondent" may conjure up
images of travel and intrigue, traditionally it has been only the
"war correspondent" who faced an actual threat of physical
harm. In order to report on events as they occurred, the war
reporter was often assigned to the front lines of battle, some-
times following a particular military unit. "Humanitarian
law," a branch of international law that is activated during
times of war, provides special protections for journalists prac-
ticing their craft during actual wartime conditions." Under the
Geneva Conventions, journalists are to be considered noncom-
batants/civilians. 2 If captured, they are given Prisoner of War
status, and their health and safety are thus guaranteed scrutiny
by the International Committee of the Red Cross.13 Such pro-
tections, however, are not currently available for journalists re-
porting on internal wars,'4 military coups, "peasant" uprisings
or terrorist attacks.'" Yet, with the political upheavals in Latin
America, the surges of terrorism in the Middle East and the
11. See infra notes 241-45 (discussing the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Proto-
col I to the Conventions, enacted in 1977). For a general discussion of the history of
the Geneva Conventions and the protection of war victims during armed conflicts, see
U.N.E.S.C.O., THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 102-05 (K. Vasek
ed. 1979).
12. U.N.E.S.C.O., supra note 11, at 102-05.
13. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS,
MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD 235-36 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MacBride Report].
14. "Internal wars" is a term used to denote undeclared wars occurring within the
territorial bounds of one sovereign state. Often, these involve power struggles be-
tween opposing governmental or ideological factions. Civil wars might be so termed.
Such "wars" have become a topic of heated international debate as the proposed Pro-
tocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 seeks to define prisoners taken in such
hostilities as Prisoners of War, thus giving them traditional noncombatant protections
and providing access to them by the International Red Cross. Many countries deem
those captured under such situations as terrorists or criminals, hence not to be pro-
tected by any external, international law. For a discussion of the Geneva Convention,
see infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
15. See Herczegh, The Extension of the Notion of Combatant in Light of the Ge-
neva Protocols of 1977, ICRC, EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON HUMANITARIAN LAw 47-60
(1980); Schwarzenberger, Terrorists, Hijackers, Guerilleros and Mercenaries, 24 CuR-
RENT LEGAL PROBS. 279-82 (1971); see also Eide, Non International Armed Conflicts
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continuing instability in parts of Southeast Asia, the threat of
detention, imprisonment, torture, and even death faces peace-
time reporters in any region of fast-breaking political news.
The situation has become acute during the past decade.16
The current political upheavals, martial law, and border con-
flicts throughout parts of Latin America make that region espe-
cially dangerous for reporters, who enter those countries at
their own risk.'7 There are both legal and diplomatic limits on
the remedial actions available to a government when one of its
citizens voluntarily enters the territory of another sovereign
state.'
Intimidation of correspondents is not restricted to Latin
America. 9 According to John Kifner, who has been a New
York Times correspondent in Beirut,
"Fear is part of the job. . . ." To work here as a journalist is to
carry fear with you as faithfully as your notebook. It is the
constant knowledge that there is nothing you can do to protect
yourself and that nothing has ever happened to any assassin.
In this atmosphere, a journalist must often weigh when, how,
and the Second Geneva Protocol, 13 COLLECTION OF LECTURES, INT'L INST. OF HUM.
RTs. § 4, at 1 (1982).
16. As a UNESCO-sponsored commission noted, "The journalistic profession has
good cause to remember the eight journalists who disappeared, and never reappeared,
in Cambodia; or the television reporter who was shot in cold blood by an officer of the
so-called National Guard in Nicaragua." MacBride Report, supra note 13, at 235.
17. This problem is by no means limited to foreign correspondents. There is also
governmental repression of domestic newspapers, radio and television in several
countries. That topic, however, is beyond the scope of this commentary.
18. See supra note 3. For example, the death of four Dutch television journalists
in El Salvador in 1981 received a great deal of coverage in the world press. The Dutch
government initiated an investigation of the ambush-style killings but ended all in-
quiry with an inconclusive report. They disagreed with the official Salvadorian gov-
ernment report that listed the deaths as "accidental" but added they could find no
proof of an "express intent" by the military patrol to kill them. Most foreign corre-
spondents in the area maintained that "the journalists and their guerilla guides had
been deliberately ambushed by the Salvadorian Army." Committee To Protect Jour-
nalists, 1 CPJ UPDATE 3-4 (1982).
On the same day the Dutch reporters were killed, a hit-list was circulated in San
Salvador with the names of 35 journalists. The list included 19 U.S. correspondents
who regularly covered Central America. Another reporter, U.S. freelance journalist
John Sullivan, has been missing since in December 1980. While U.S. Ambassador De-
ane Hinton says that "a disproportionate amount of the resources of the American
Embassy have been put into this case," Sullivan's family claims that the government
has been lax in its investigation. Id. at 4, 7.
19. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1982, at A4, col. 3. In 1980, Reuters Beirut bureau chief,
Berndt de Bussman, was shot; he survived but switched posts. BBC correspondents
Timothy Llewellyn and James Muir were evacuated to Cyprus to cover the Middle
East from a safe distance. Id.
COMM/ENT L. J.
and sometimes even whether, to record a story.20
Statistical studies indicate that these fears are well founded.
According to a report by the International Press Institute, cov-
ering a fifteen month period from 1976 to 1978, twenty-four
journalists were murdered, fifty-seven were wounded, tortured
or kidnapped and thirteen newspaper offices were bombed.21
In addition, Amnesty International reports that 104 correspon-
dents were imprisoned or "missing" in twenty-five different
countries during 1977 alone.22 Even more often, journalists are
simply expelled from countries for "digging too deeply" or pub-
lishing articles that a controlling regime claims to be "false and
unfounded.
'23
This continued and increasing intimidation of journalists is a
significant obstacle to the flow of information. Such violence
effectively impairs the reporters' ability to gather information,
the news media's ability to publish information and, ultimately,
the world population's ability to receive that information.
When journalists are effectively denied access to regions of vio-
lence and political upheaval, a free flow of global information
cannot exist.
B. The Background
1. The "Free Flow" Tradition
Until the close of World War Two, the world's news flow was
dominated by the old European news service cartels. The Brit-
ish, with Reuters and British Cables, were particularly domi-
nant in this area. Additionally, there were the French Havas
and German Wolf Services.24 The world was divided into terri-
20. Id.
21. MacBride Report, supra note 13, at 235.
22. Id. In April 1982, Turkish military authorities "reprimanded" Metin Munir,
correspondent for BBC and Financial Times, for sending "false and unfounded sto-
ries." He was told that he would be deported if "one more such report" appeared in
the foreign press. 1 CPJ UPDATE 1, 8 (1982). Two U.S. reporters, Charles Powers of
the Los Angeles Times and Robert Rosenthal of the Philadelphia Inquirer, claim that
the Ugandan military arrested them without charges, beat them and detained them
for two days in May of 1982. After their release both reporters left Uganda at the
suggestion of the U.S. Embassy. Id. at 6.
23. On July 14, 1982, the foreign ministry of Thailand "ordered the diplomatic
correspondent of the Asian Wall Street Journal, Barry Wain, to leave that country
because of an article ... he wrote about conditions at a Thai-run refugee camp." N.Y.
Times, July 16, 1982, at A4, col. 1.
24. Schiller, The Free Flow of Information-For Whom?, in MASS MEDIA POLI-
CIES IN CHANGING CULTURES 105 (G. Gerbner ed. 1977).
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25torial allotments for the various news collection services.
At the end of World War Two, the notion that there should
be a "free flow" of information throughout the world became a
cause celebre in the United States.26 In a State Department
broadcast in January 1946, William Benton, then Assistant Sec-
retary of State, outlined the position of the United States
government:
The State Department plans to do everything within its power
along political or diplomatic lines to help break down the arti-
ficial barriers to the expansion of private American news agen-
cies, magazines, motion pictures and other media of
communications throughout the world .... Freedom of the
press-the freedom of exchange of information generally-is
an integral part of our foreign policy.
27
At the end of the war, efforts by the victorious nations were
aimed at establishing workable global mechanisms whereby
peace could be maintained through the application and devel-
opment of international law.28 The United States dominated
these talks and the "free flow" of information became a vital
element of the postwar international diplomatic and legal
structures. Due largely to initiatives of the United States, the
free flow of information issue became one of the newly-formed
UNESCO's major concerns; a "Free Flow of Information" sec-
tion was created in 1946, and still exists in UNESCO's Mass
25. For example, at the turn of the century the French news service, Havas,
largely controlled news coverage for Latin America, and the British dominated the
world's supply of oceanic cables. Id. In light of Third World complaints about the
modern dominance of American-based news agencies, it is interesting to look at the
complaints made by Kent Cooper, executive manager of Associated Press in 1934. He
said that given their dominant position, Rueters and Havas:
1. "kept out Associated Press competition,
2. "were free to present American news disparagingly to the United States if they
presented it at all,
3. "could present news of their own countries most favorabl[y] and without it be-
ing contradicted." Id. at 107.
26. Id. In one speech, Palmer Hoyt, an American publisher, said, "I believe...
that the world is headed for ... [another] war and destruction unless immediate steps
are taken to insure the beginning at least of freedom of the news-American style-
between the peoples of the earth. A civilization that is not informed ... cannot en-
dure." Id. at 106 (exce?ptedfrom VITAL SPEECHES 12, at 60-62 (J. Knight ed. 1946)).
27. 14 DEP'T ST. BULL. 160 (Feb. 1946). John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
during the Cold War years, added, "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy
and no other, I would make it the free flow of information." Schiller, supra note 24,
at 108.
28. Schiller, supra note 24, at 110-11.
No. 11
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Communication Division.29 On December 14, 1946, the first
General Assembly of the United Nations stated that "freedom
of information is a fundamental human right and is a touch-
stone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is
consecrated.
30
In the intervening years this "free flow" terminology has
been incorporated into provisions of various international legal
documents." However, the interpretation of these provisions
has changed. This is due in, part to a dramatic change in the
basic composition of the United Nations (U.N.). There were
fifty sovereign states attending the initial U.N. sessions.32 Ap-
proximately two-thirds of those were Latin American and, at
that time, under U.S. influence.3 Today, of the approximately
160 sovereign states represented at the U.N., 120 are considered
developing countries. These countries formed an alliance
known as the "Group of 77,"1 which presents a united front on
many issues. One of the causes around which they are cur-
rently rallying is the "New World Information Order.
'35
2. The Status Quo of "Free Flow" v. A New World
Information Order
We believe that at the present time what is known as the
"free flow of information" is in fact often a "one-way" flow,
rather than a genuine exchange of information .... 36
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights37 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights38 guaran-
tee a right to "seek, receive and impart information," regard-
less of frontiers.3 9 This language would seem to embody the
sentiment represented by the traditional "free flow" theory.40
29. Id.
30. See id. at 111; UNESCO, YEARBOOK ON HuMAN RIGHTS FOR 1947, at 439
(1949).
31. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
32. Schiller, supra note 24, at 110.
33. Id.
34. It was termed the "Group of 77" because it was originally comprised of that
number of nonaligned developing countries.
35. See generally Masmoudi, supra note 6.
36. Final Report, UNESCO Meeting in Montreal, Can. (1969).
37. Universal Declaration, supra note 2.
38. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as International Covenant].
39. Id. art. 13.
40. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
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However, many developing countries41 feel that this laissez-
faire attitude toward the gathering and dissemination of world
news has led to a drastic imbalance in the flow of information.
They see the influx of Western-biased reports by the few huge
international news agencies as eroding their cultural values
and, hence, threatening their "cultural sovereignty" and
autonomy.42
At its 1978 General Conference, UNESCO issued a Declara-
tion on the Mass Media.4 Article I of this document states that
today's global interests "demand" both "afreeflow and a better
balanced dissemination of information." 44 Article II states that
"the exercise of opinion, expression and information, is recog-
nized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental
freedoms . . . . 4 Furthermore,
[t]he [General] Conference Report acknowledged that . . . to
that end, journalists must have freedom to report and the ful-
lest possible facilities of access to information .... It is essen-
tial that journalists and other agents of mass media, in their
own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing
them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession.46
From this language, it would seem that UNESCO was firmly
committed to both the protection of foreign journalists and to
the same notions of a free flow of information that the U.S.
promulgated back in 1948. However, this same Declaration
41. The term "developing countries" as used in this commentary will be synony-
mous with "Third World" and "the South." Generally, this terminology denotes non-
industrial or slowly industrializing countries, mostly in Africa, Latin America and
Southeast Asia. Many of these are currently in a state of political instability. Third
World "developing" nations are sometimes distinguished from the Fourth World's
subsistence and below subsistence economies. However, this distinction is not made in
this commentary.
42. See Schilling, supra note 24, at 112; Nanda, The Communication Revolution
and the Free Flow of Information in a Transnational Setting, 30 AMER. J. COMP. L.
411, 413 (1982). The following quote from Indira Ghandi, India's late Prime Minister,
is an example: "India's achievements are ignored with a perverse consistency, while
its short-comings are presented with exaggerated glee." N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1981, at
A4, col. 4. Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, Director-General of UNESCO has warned,
"When the mass communication media persistently purvey systems of values foreign
to the countries of a given region, there is danger that in the long run they will efface
or obliterate the region's own values. It is in this sense that one can say that uncon-
trolled development of the mass communication media makes it difficult for many
countries to assert their cultural identity." UNESCO, COM/MD/38, at 51.
43. UNESCO, General Conference Declaration on Mass Media (1978), reprinted
in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 276 (1978).





calls for a "new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the flow
of information, which will be conducive to . . . the economic
and political independence of the developing countries. '47 A
great deal of tension exists between the political perspective of
those developing countries seeking political and cultural auton-
omy, and that of the Western press espousing an interest in
maintaining the free flow of information."
As a result of the growing tension over the state of global
information coverage and dissemination, the Director-General
of UNESCO appointed [the MacBride Commission] to study the
state of global communication.49 In an interim report, Commis-
sion member Mustapha Musmoudi from Tunisia called for the
introduction of a "New World Information Order" (NWIO)
that would provide for:
1. regulation of the right to information by preventing abu-
sive uses of the right of access to information,
2. regulation of the collection, processing and transmission of
news and data across national frontiers and
3. creation of a supranational 5 organization to oversee the
correction of "false and biased news accounts."'"
The final report of the MacBride Commission deleted the
call for a state-controlled communications regulatory body. It
did, however, call for further study into the possibility of creat-
ing a supranational professional body to oversee the safety and
movement of international journalists.52
47. Id. at 277.
48. For a thorough discussion of the tension between the developing countries
and the Western countries, see MacBride Report, supra note 13, at 34-40.
49. The MacBride Commission, established in 1977, consisted of representatives
from 16 countries. Representing the United States was Elie Able, a journalist, broad-
caster, and professor of Communications at Stanford University. As a result of its
two-year study, the Commission issued the MacBride Report, supra note 13.
50. "Supranational" is used here to mean an organization into which state mem-
bers have pooled some degree or area of sovereignty. Examples of supranational orga-
nizations are the U.N. and the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC
signs agricultural treaties on behalf of all member states.
51. See UNESCO Docs. 200/94 (1979) and 20C/31 (1978); Nanda, supra note 42, at
411 (1982).
52. MacBride Report, supra note 13, at 274. It is important to note that in the final
text this call for a licensing mechanism was not formally approved by the Commission
and was preceded by a caveat to that effect. According to Professor Elie Abel, this call
for licensing was part of a list prepared by participant Masmoudi, principle proponent
of the NWIO. Telephone interview with Elie Abel, U.S. representative to the Mac-
Bride Commission (Jan. 25, 1983).
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C. The Gaborit Proposal
The issue of the NWIO, particularly the licensing of profes-
sional journalists, reemerged in February 1981 at a UNESCO
meeting in Paris. Taking up the MacBride Commission recom-
mendation for further study of the identity card proposal,
UNESCO sponsored the preparation of a draft plan by Pierre
Gaborit, professor of political science at the University of North
Paris. Gaborit proposed establishing a Commission for the Pro-
tection of Journalists.53 The Commission, as he envisioned it,
would have two primary functions: (1) issuing identification
cards ("licenses") to journalists and (2) drawing up an interna-
tional code of ethics for professional journalists. 54 Gaborit as-
serted that the Commission could "reduce the risks run by
journalists... by enabling them to identify themselves rapidly
in all circumstances. 55
In general, the Western press was vehemently opposed to the
plan.' In the Western tradition, newspapers abide by inter-
nally imposed codes of ethics. Western journalists feared the
fact that the Commission could require those "professional
journalists" who received the identity cards to abide by an ex-
ternal, government-determined code. Furthermore, identity
cards authorizing press access could also be revoked. In effect,
Western reporters feared that the Commission would decide
who would and would not have access to the news based on
compliance with whatever "ethical" criteria it deemed
necessary.58
In addition, while the Commission would initially be a non-
governmental group composed of representatives of news agen-
cies, Gaborit envisioned it as evolving into an official interna-
tional organ composed of government representatives.59 Thus,
the Gaborit proposal was seen by many U.S. journalists as a
form of governmental press regulation on an international
53. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, at All, col. 1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See N.Y. Times, May 18, 1981, at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1981, at A4, col.
1 (reprinting The Declaration of Talloires in which representatives of the Western
press declared their unified and vehement opposition to UNESCO's "licensing" of for-
eign correspondents).
57. See B. SWAIN, REPORTERS' ETHICS 111-34 (1978), for examples of existing
codes of ethics adhered to by various Western newspapers and news services.





Professor Gaborit's proposal ultimately was discussed at a
UNESCO meeting held in Paris in February 1981.61 In answer
to the plan, two resolutions were proposed, one by representa-
tives of Western nations and one by a coalition of Eastern 2 and
Third World countries. The Western proposal described the li-
censing plan as dangerous to a free press and recommended
that "all authorities should recognize and honor the credentials
that journalists already possess that identify them."6 3  Both
proposals were submitted to UNESCO for further study.' The
proposal to license journalists and subsequent refinements of
the original plan are still the focus of international debate.6
In 1981, the United States House of Representatives passed
an amendment that would have cut off all U.S. monetary sup-
port to UNESCO if that organization continued to move toward
international regulation of the press.6 The bill to which this
amendment was attached was ultimately defeated for other
reasons.6 7  The Reagan Administration, however, ultimately
did effect a complete withdrawal of United States participation
in, and support of, UNESCO. UNESCO's "attempts ... to
redefine the role of a free press" were allegedly central to the
Administration's decision. 9
Essentially, the Western nations believe that the threat to
the free flow of information (freedom of the press) outweighs
any possible protection journalists could receive by such pro-
posed measures; Western journalists fear that the code of ethics
with which they would have to comply would likely be biased
60. The terms "governmental" and "nongovernmental" are used to denote
whether the decision-making comes from government officials and representatives or
from the press itself. The former is considered by the American press to be govern-
mental control of the press and, hence, antithetical to the first amendment. However,
whether the representatives are governmental or private does not affect the binding,
normative nature of the rules of ethics devised by the group. The lawmaking nature
of the Commission would not be derived from the individual composition of its seated
members, but rather from UNESCO and ultimately the U.N. itself.
61. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1981, at A2, col. 5.
62. Here "Eastern" refers to the communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe.
63. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1981, at A2, col. 5.
64. Id.
65. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at A22, col. 1.
66. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1981, at A4, col. 6. The United States has supplied as
much as 25% of UNESCO's budget. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 10.
69. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at A7, col. 2.
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in favor of forwarding the Third World's needs as embodied in
the NWIO.70 Yet, the fact remains that, without protection,
journalists are deported, harassed and killed. The problem of
violence against journalists still contravenes the freedom of in-
formation and expression provisions in international human
rights documents. It seems that some method of protection, in-
ternational or supranational in scope, could alter this situation.
Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the licensing
scheme proposed by Gaborit is truly abhorrent to notions of a
free press as may have developed in international law, and, if
so, whether there are any alternative methods available to pro-
tect journalists and insure the flow of worldwide news and
information.
The extent to which freedom of the press has developed
under international law can be discerned by examining the pro-
tections prescribed by international human rights documents,
as well as the norms of behavior that have developed in state
practice over time.
III
"Freedom of the Press" Under International Law
In order to determine whether a program such as the Gaborit
proposal would be legal under international law, one must as-
certain whether there are protections equivalent to "freedom
of the press" at the international level, and, if there are, how
widely recognized are such protections. Given that insuring the
relative safety and security of journalists is essential to their
access to, and reporting of, global information, would the estab-
lishment of an international licensing commission be in viola-
tion of such protections law? Are these protections
"customary," and thus applicable to all nations? Or are they
limited to specific provisions in various international docu-
ments, and thus binding only on signatory parties?
A. The Nature and Source of International Law
For a realistic and meaningful analysis of press rights and
responsibilities under international law, this commentary must
be premised on the notion that the international declarations,
documents, mechanisms, and customs to be discussed herein
70. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
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encompass a true body of "law.' 71 International law is a "for-
mulation, by collective authoritative decision, of rules of ex-
pected conduct. ' 72  Sovereign states act with regard to
international prescriptive rules of behavior.73 There can be lit-
tle doubt that, while the world is marked by crisis and conflict,
long-term self-interest and the instinct for self-preservation
generally cause states to act within the bounds of international
norms.
74
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice75 delineates and codifies the accepted "sources" of modern
international law:
a. International conventions ... establishing rules expressly
71. Certainly, there are ways of defining law that would tend to exclude that
which we term "international law." Theoretical models requiring judicial decrees and
enforcement mechanisms do not accurately describe the international system. Yet,
the widely-accepted modern definition of the "nature" of law is that it is normative
and positivistic. Such great legal philosophers as Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin have
voiced doubts as to the binding nature of international rules for state behavior. See
Kaplan & Katzenbach, Law in the International Community, reprinted in R. FALD &
S. MENDLOVITZ, THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER: INTERNATIONAL LAw 21 (1966).
See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 468 (1897). Austin, for
example, focused on a hierarchical structure, theorizing that rules become authorita-
tive and binding because they are sovereign commands. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 267-
71 (5th ed. 1885). This analysis would tend to exclude modern "international law,"
which has a basically horizontal structure; legal authority is derived from sovereign
states-technically equal foci of legal authority.
72. S. RIESENFELD & G. HAUK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 6
(unpublished ed.).
73. See Kaplan & Katzenbach, supra note 71, at 24. "Upon occasion, and particu-
larly in times of crisis, states act without regard to what is generally accepted as con-
trolling doctrine," but even in a domestic system, noncompliance with the law by
some members of the society does not negate the fact that the law exists.
Cicero felt that law emerged from the formation of a cohesive community. Under
more modern analyses, that community must be marked by a certain cognizable de-
gree of cohesion. See S. RIESENFELD & G. HAUK, supra note 72, at 1, 2.
74. See Kaplan & Katzenbach, supra note 71, at 24, 25. The overthrow of the shah
of Iran in 1978 was an example of.a deviation from the norm.
The fact that most states have accepted---and begun to implement-the concept of a
"New International Economic Order," calling for a redistribution of the world's
wealth and resources, is testimony to existence of an interdependent world commu-
nity of states. The fact that sovereign states have given up a degree of that sover-
eignty to supranational institutions such as the U.N. and the EEC is further evidence
that nations feel compelled by forces of cohesion for continued existence.
75. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the
U.N. Charter, signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, at the culmination of the U.N.
Conference on International Organization. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
is the "principal judicial organ" of the United Nations and takes the place of what was
formerly the Permanent Court of International Justice under the League of Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 92, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
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recognized by the contesting states;
76
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
77
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary
76. These international instruments provide some degree of documentary evi-
dence of consensus between signatory states regarding the status of free expression.
However, their legal applicability varies greatly depending on how they are character-
ized, i.e., as treaties, conventions, or declarations. A treaty is an international written
agreement, concluded between states and governed by principles of international law,
which has been ratified in such a way as to manifest a consent to be legally bound.
Under the traditional notion of pacta sunt servanta, a treaty in force is "binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, arts. 26, 34; see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289.
A convention (or multilateral treaty) generally holds the legal character of a treaty,
but usually has broader scope and a greater number of signatory parties. As a general
rule, a treaty can confer neither rights nor obligations on third party, nonsignatory
states; however, if the parties to the treaty so intend, third parties can assent to a right
conferred or can in writing expressly accept an obligation. Id. arts. 35, 36.
A declaration, on the other hand, is generally considered to be only a statement of
policy and principles. While it cannot be invoked against violating signatories, never-
theless, the wording of such a document is often looked at in order to construe the
meaning of provisions in conventions and treaties.
77. The great bulk of international law is comprised not of formal treaties, but of
"customary" law. The creation of such normative customary law requires two ele-
ments: (1) state practice and (2) opinio juris, or the belief by nations that their ac-
tions are not voluntary but are compelled by existing international norms. If the
right to a free flow of information, in the form of a "freedom of the press," exists as
customary international law, its effects will be far more extensive than those of any
multilateral treaty; customary law binds all states, while the binding nature of trea-
ties is mostly restricted to signatory parties. Customary law may be directly cogniza-
ble in U.S. domestic courts under certain circumstances, while treaties are only
directly internally applicable in domestic courts when they are considered self-exe-
cuting. Otherwise a special congressional statute is required to transform the treaty
provisions into law that is directly cognizable in domestic courts.
A self-executing treaty is one which does not require a domestic, congressional act
to make it cognizable in domestic courts. There is some controversy, however, regard-
ing the method of determining when a treaty is or is not self-executing. The Fifth
Circuit recently determined that Article 6 of the Convention of the High Seas, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. no. 5200, is not self-executing, holding that the
U.S. intent at the time of ratification is the determining factor. United States v. Pos-
tal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979). Professor Stephan Riesenfeld, on the other hand,
believes that the Fifth Circuit "erred egregiously in the choice of the criteria for the
determination of whether or not Article 6... is self-executing." In his view, the self-
executing nature of a treaty is determined by the full legislative history of the docu-
ment-the intent of all parties. If rights and duties that are cognizable and "capable
of being applied by the courts without further concretization [are created, the treaty]
is self-executing" when ratified, irrespective of the domestic legislative intent. Rie-
senfeld, The Doctrine of SeVfExecuting Treaties and U.S. v. Postal Win at Any
Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 900, 901.
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means for the determination of rules of law.78
These "sources" form the legal basis for cases adjudicated in
international, regional, and domestic tribunals, and for most
disputes decided under international negotiation and arbitra-
tionJ9 Most of what is considered to be today's body of interna-
tional law falls under the first two categories, commonly
referred to as "treaty law" and "customary international
law. 80
In order to determine whether a licensing program would vi-
olate international law, it is necessary to examine the extent to
which international agreements protect freedom of expression,
particularly the press's access to newsmakers and events, and
whether any such press rights have become customary.
B. Freedom of Expression Under International Documents-
Treaties, Declarations, and Agreements
Unlike the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, provi-
sions in several international documents expressly describe
rights to gather information,8 ' to cross international borders to
do so,8 2 and to disseminate the information in various media. 3
However, the documents also place limitations upon these
rights,s4 recognize other seemingly conflicting rights, or pro-
vide an option for temporary derogation of the rights under
certain, albeit extreme, circumstances.
The documents to be discussed can be distinguished in three
ways: (1) the degree to which they are legally binding on signa-
tory states, (2) the breadth of the right(s) conferred, as nar-
rowed by any limiting clauses, and (3) the scope of their
applicability, i.e., the number of states adhering to the particu-
lar documents.8 5
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 92, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
79. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 37 n.1 (1980).
80. While nations can conclude informal agreements and private contracts, this
commentary deals only with public international documents.
81. See International Covenant, supra note 38, art. 19(2).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The limitations often take the form of reciprocal duties placed upon the indi-
vidual in return for the right granted. In this sense the documents draw upon the
Soviet view of human rights, whereby the rights of the individual can only exist in
the framework of that individual citizen's duties to society. See generally U.S.S.R.
CONST.; LAW IN SOVIET SOCIETY (W. LaFave ed. 1965).
85. The scope of the various international documents can be further categorized
according to the geographic extent of their impact. Under the first category are those
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1. Human Rights-U.N. Style
(a) The U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
The United Nations Charter makes only vague references to
"human rights" and "fundamental freedoms," and the meaning
of these terms is never spelled out in the document.8 In order
to clarify the extent of these rights and freedoms, the U.N.
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration) on December 10, 1948.87 This document defined
and enumerated those human rights to which the members of
the U.N. had already pledged themselves in the Charter. The
Universal Declaration tried to define human rights in such a
way that all nations would agree, incorporating "concepts from
a universe of ideas that had become a common heritage. ' 88 In
theory, the Universal Declaration's scope is coextensive with
that of the U.N. Charter, serving as the definitional vehicle of
materials which have sometimes been termed the "International Bill of Human
Rights." See American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, In-
ternational Bill of Human Rights (Final Authorized Text of the United Nations).
These documents, aimed at giving voice, definition, and legal effect to the human
rights provisions of the U.N. Charter, are international, or supranational, in scope,
focusing on problems at the global level.
In the second category are documents that are regional in scope. In this context,
"regional" applies to those documents drawing together and binding states within a
certain geographic region. In particular, there are relevant articles in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, infra
note 130, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res.
XXX (1948), adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States in
Bogota, and the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty
Series No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L./V/II. 23 doc. rev. 2 [hereinafter cited
as American Convention].
86. On June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, the first U.N. Charter was signed. Among
the expressly enumerated purposes of the U.N. was the achievement of "international
co-operation... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fun-
damental freedoms for all." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. Member states, by becom-
ing signatories to the Charter, have "pledge[d] themselves to take joint and separate
action ... for the achievement of these purposes." Id. art. 56. The Charter is legally
binding upon all member states.
87. Universal Declaration, supra note 2.
88. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLIT-
ICAL RIGHTS 27 (L. Henkin ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS]. This notion of a "common heritage" must be used with caution as it has
become a term of art for more recent property concepts in international law. During
the last decade, this notion has been incorporated into multinational treaties concern-
ing outer space and the deep sea bed. See, e.g., Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Nov. 12, 1979, art. 11, U.N. Doc. A/34/
664.
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human rights for all members of the United Nations. 9 Yet,
under international law the legal effect of a declaration is very
limited in degree. 90 In general, a declaration is neither enforce-
able nor legally binding; it has merely a definitional, explana-
tory, and/or "moral" value.91 The Universal Declaration,
however, was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly with the
express purpose of implementing the human rights pledge of
the U.N. Charter. Some commentators feel that this gives the
document a somewhat more binding effect under international
law than a normal U.N. General Assembly recommendation.92
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration grants all people the
"right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom ... to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
. . . regardless of frontiers. '93 The breadth of this right is lim-
ited only by Article 29, which places certain duties on the indi-
vidual in connection with the granted rights.94 Article 29 also
narrowly limits the reasons for which a state can legislate limi-
tations of such fundamental human rights; human rights may
be restricted only for the purpose of: (1) "securing due recogni-
tion and respect for the rights and freedoms of others," and
(2) "meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
and the general welfare."95
Unlike the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 6 the
Universal Declaration expressly describes a right to gather
news, i.e., to "seek" information as part of the "freedom of ex-
pression."' 9  Of course, the extent of this "right"9 depends
upon the weight given to the Article 29 restrictions. 99 For ex-
ample, the "morality" requirement imposed by Article 2910
would appear to apply to restrictions on dissemination-com-
89. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 88, at 8.
90. Id. at 9.
91. See infra note 160.
92. Id. See U.N.E.S.C.O., supra note 11, at 22. This view was expressed by Rene
Cassin, principal drafter of the Universal Declaration.
93. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 19.
94. Article 29 provides, "Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
the free and full development of his personality is possible." Id. art. 29(1).
95. Id. art. 29(2).
96. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1965).
97. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 19.
98. This has also been called a "fundamental freedom," seemingly a similar stan-
dard to that applied to a "right."




porting with our domestic restrictions on obscenity. 101
(b) The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
Although the Universal Declaration represented a giant step
forward in the universal recognition of the existence of a free-
dom of expression, it was an instrument with little legal "bite."
Even under the U.N. Charter, member states pledged them-
selves only to "promoting and encouraging" a general "respect"
for human rights.10 2 It was not until March 23, 1976, when the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Interna-
tional Covenant) entered into force, that the freedom of ex-
pression became a legally binding right under international
law. 103
The International Covenant0 4 is a treaty-level document, le-
gally binding upon signatory states. 0 5 The International Cove-
nant added "bite" by establishing a Human Rights
Committee 0 6 to police the status of human rights within states
that were parties to the document.0 7 Thus, in theory, states
that have signed and ratified0 8 the International Covenant
have not only bound themselves to adhere to the human rights
provisions that the document describes, but have also agreed to
allow external scrutiny of their internal affairs. The Interna-
tional Covenant is supranational in degree; states have volunta-
rily given up a piece of their traditional sovereign right to
exclusive control of their internal affairs.
In its scope, the International Covenant is binding only upon
states which have duly signed and ratified it. 0 9 Its binding na-
101. Under the U.S. Constitution, first amendment protection does not extend to
obscenity or pornography. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Paris Adult
Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973).
102. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56.
103. International Covenant, supra note 38.
104. A companion document is The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI).
105. For a discussion of the concept of legally binding documents, see supra note
76.
106. International Covenant, supra note 38, art. 28.
107. Id. arts. 40-45.
108. I.e., states that have legally bound themselves as "parties" to a treaty under
international law. Id. See Geneva Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969,
art. 2(1)(g), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27.
109. International Covenant, supra note 38, art. 49. The International Covenant
was developed under the auspices of the U.N. to further implement the Charter's
human rights provisions. It is open to members of the U.N., its specialized agencies, or
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ture may also be diminished by any valid reservations made by
the state at the time of ratification. 110 Potentially, it encom-
passes almost all sovereign nations.
Yet, unlike the Universal Declaration, which contained very
similar definitions of rights, many nations are unwilling to rat-
ify the International Covenant."' The United States, to date,
has not ratified either the International Covenant or the Op-
tional Protocol.'12 Among the reasons cited by commentators
for the U.S. failure to ratify the International Covenant, is a
fear of domestic and international repercussions that may arise
due to the binding nature of the documents and the explicitly
defined standards to which our government may be held ac-
countable. 113 Moreover there is an apparent conflict between
Article 20's prohibition of any "propaganda for war" or "advo-
cacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes in-
citement to discrimination, hostility or violence" and the first
amendment guarantee of the right of free speech.
114
Ascertaining the breadth of the right granted in an interna-
tional document is paramount in determining the extent to
which "freedom of the press" and a right of newsgathering is
recognized under international law. Exactly what press right is
delineated and how is it limited?
The "freedom of expression" described in Article 19(2) of the
International Covenant is almost identical to that in Article 19
of the Universal Declaration.'- 5 Nevertheless, while the Uni-
versal Declaration simply describes the rights that people theo-
retically "have," the International Covenant says that people
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Any other state invited to
do so by the U.N. can become a party to the Covenant. Id. art. 48(1).
110. Id. arts. 19-21.
111. As of January 1, 1980, 61 states had signed and ratified the International Cove-
nant; 22 had ratified the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. Human Rights Interna-
tional Instruments: Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc., U.N. Doc. ST/HR/4/
Rev. 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights International Instruments].
112. Id. The U.S. delegation has signed the International Covenant and Optional
Protocol, but Congress has refused to ratify them.
113. See generally U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR
WITHOUT RESERVATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1981).
114. Letter of Submittal, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17, 1977) (let-
ter to the President).
115. Article 19(2) provides, "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expres-
sion; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice." International Covenant, supra
note 38, art. 19(2).
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"shall have" these rights-thus implying that the rights must
be created by the rule of law and enforced domestically. 16
Another vital difference between the two documents is that
the International Covenant distinguishes between the free-
doms of "opinion""' 7 and "expression. '"118 "Opinion" is an abso-
lute right, while "expression" is subject to restrictions, limited
by principles of legality and necessity."1 9 A state may pass laws
encroaching on the freedom of expression in order to protect
the "rights or reputations of others,'1 20 "national security,"
public order, or "public health or morals.'
21
The duties and responsibilities incident to the right of ex-
pression are not specifically defined. However, it must be
remembered that the International Covenant is an interna-
tional document, drawing upon a broad range of political phi-
losophies. If the idea of freedom of expression carries with it
certain U.S. constitutional connotations, the notion of duties to
society is derived from the Soviet concept of human rights.
Under the Soviet Constitution of 1977, "The realization of
rights and freedoms shall be inseparable from the execution by
a citizen of his duties.' 22 According to the Soviet conception,
freedom of information does not exist in the abstract, but
rather in a particular socioeconomic context. Accordingly, in-
formation should promote the development of socialism and,
thus, the eventual good of the people.12  Information that is
harmful to socialism is banned; 24 information is an aspect of
state policy and is controlled by the state. 25
From the Soviet perspective, this notion of duty could be-
come a rather broad limitation on the right of foreign corre-
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 19(1).
118. Id. art. 19(2).
119. K. PARTSCH, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms,
in THE INTERNATIOAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 88, at 221.
120. International Covenant, supra note 38, art. 19(3)(a).
121. Id. art. 19(3)(b). For the different definitions of ordre public, see THE INTER-
NATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 88, at 299. In general, the term deals with a
broad concept of public safety. Under French law, this is derived from the state's
police power. Id.
122. U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 59 (1977).
123. B. RAMUNDO, They Answer (To) Pravda, in LAW IN SOVIET SOCIETY, supra
note 84, at 126.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 126-27. See U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. 39-58, for an enumeration of the basic
human rights, arts. 60-69, for a discussion of the duties of the citizen, and art. 59, for a
discussion of the inseparability of these rights and duties.
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spondents to gather news; foreigners within Soviet territorial
jurisdiction 126 are subject to both the rights and obligations of
the Soviet Constitution. If the seeking of the information was
interpreted as harmful to socialism, it could be disallowed.
127
In defense of a broad interpretation of the newsgathering
right, one can look to the travaux preparatoires, or legislative
history, of the documents.12 At the time of the drafting of the
International Covenant, some states wished to use the wording
"to gather" rather than "to seek" information. They felt that
the former would exclude a right of active inquiry that could
be used to probe into the internal affairs of other governments.
This restrictive construction was not accepted, implying that




The rise of regional institutions for the protection of human
rights represents a major step forward for the transnational
preservation of the "rule of law." However, the development of
such mechanisms is still in its infancy. The European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention) 3 ° may serve as the proto-
type for other regional institutions. It was drafted by the Coun-
cil of Europe and is binding on all member states of the
Council.'
31
Both the International Covenant and the European Conven-
tion are legally binding documents under international law.
The International Covenant now binds over sixty states, 32 the
126. Under the traditional notion of territorial jurisdiction a nation-state has com-
plete sovereignty over all that exists or occurs within the territorial limits of its bor-
ders and territorial waters. Thus, the courts of the state are considered to have
jurisdiction over cases arising, or persons residing within those physical boundaries.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (5th ed. 1979).
127. See U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 59. The Soviets have a state-run press. B. RAMUNDO,
supra note 123, at 126-27.
128. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 88, at 25-26.
129. K. PARTSCH, supra note 119, at 218.
130. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European Convention].
131. H. PETZOLD, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS I (4th ed. 1981).
Liechtenstein was the most recent member of the Council of Europe to ratify the
European Convention. See GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 301
(H. Hannom ed. 1984).
132. Human Rights International Instruments, supra note 111, at 12.
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European Convention only twenty.13 But what the European
Convention lacks in scope of application, it makes up in legal
effectiveness. Though the International Covenant establishes
the Human Rights Committee,3 the most that this body can do
is conduct fact-finding inquiries and execute "reports.' 3 5  The
European Convention, on the other hand, establishes machin-
ery for the international supervision of member states, helping
insure observation and enforcement of its provisions.
136
Article 10 of the European Convention, which proclaims that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression,' 1 37 is actu-
ally more limited than the equivalent section in the Interna-
tional Covenant. 3 8  The licensing of film and
telecommunications is expressly allowed; 3 9 a long list of ac-
ceptable "formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties" is
also permitted.
40
It is not surprising that the provisions in a regional instru-
ment such as the European Convention are more detailed and
directly binding upon states than international documents
133. H. PETZOLD, supra note 131, at 1.
134. International Covenant, supra note 38, art. 28.
135. Id. art. 41.
136. In its structural hierarchy, the European Convention provides for:
1) the European Commission of Human Rights: designed to conduct inquiry and
make settlements, European Convention, supra note 130, arts. 20, 24-28;
2) the Committee of Ministers: a political/decision-making organ, id. art. 32;
3) the European Court of Human Rights: a judicial/decision-making organ, id.
arts. 19, 45. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers and judgments of the Court are
binding upon the state parties involved. Id. arts. 32, 52.
137. European Convention, supra note 130, art. 10. Article 10 reads:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions-and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broad-
casting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
for the protection of reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclo-
sure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.
Id. art. 10.
138. This makes sense since the extent of what is denoted in the European Con-
vention creates a binding constraint on sovereign action by the individual member
state.
139. European Convention, supra note 130, art. 10(1).
140. Id. art. 10(2).
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designed to apply to many widely divergent countries with dif-
fering interests. Countries within one region share a much
clearer, more common understanding of the human rights de-
scribed by the documentary provisions. The greater the con-
sensus among states, the greater the likelihood of successfully
delineating and implementing the rule of law.
Latin America, replete with political upheavals and internal
wars,141 currently poses an obvious threat to the safety of jour-
nalists and, hence, to the free flow of information and expres-
sion. 142 Article 13 of the American Convention on Human
Rights 43 creates a "freedom of thought and expression," using
language almost identical to that in the International Cove-
nant. 4 4 It is, however, subject to a myriad of valid restrictions.
These restrictions are set out in detail and encompass those
found in most other international documents. 4 5
141. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. American Convention, supra note 85.
144. Article 13(1) of the American Convention provides, "Everyone has the right
to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice." Id.
art. 13(1).
145. Article 13, sections 2 through 5 describe the restrictions on this right:
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall
not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposi-
tion of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent
necessary to ensure:
a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or
means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint,
radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of
information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication
and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertain-
ments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regu-
lating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national racial or reli-
gious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or any other simi-
lar illegal action against any person or group of persons on any grounds
including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be
considered as offenses punishable by law.
Id. art. 13(2)-(5).
LICENSING OF JOURNALISTS
3. Other International Instruments
(a) The Geneva Conventions, Protocol I--Journalists in
War Zones
It has been said that "[i]t is probably safer to be in the army
than to write about it."'1 46 Thirty-nine journalists were listed as
killed in the fighting during World War II, as were three in the
Korean conflict. Forty-five journalists were killed and eight-
een are still listed as "missing" in Vietnam.
147
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 comprise a branch of inter-
national law often termed "humanitarian law.' 148  They are
multinational treaties, the provisions of which are activated
during times of war.
Article 79 of the Geneva Conventions Protocol I establishes
protection for "journalists engaged in dangerous professional
missions in areas of armed conflict.' 1 49 They are protected as
individuals with "civilian" status.a" Under this provision, jour-
nalists working in a professional capacity, can obtain an "iden-
tity card" attesting to their status.'
51
While Article 79 may sound similar to the Gaborit identity
card proposal, it is distinguishable in several important ways.
First, as part of the Geneva Conventions, Article 79 is activated
only during specifically defined wartime situations. 52 Second,
Protocol I creates no compulsion to obtain such a card; the jour-
nalist may do so at his or her discretion. The card can be issued
by any one of three different governments: the journalist's
own government, the government of the territory in which the
journalist resides, or the government of the news medium that
employs the journalist.153 Finally, the journalist is promised
protection as a civilian regardless of whether or not he or she
146. Knightly, Journalists in Armed Conflicts-The Responsibility and Protection
on Dangerous Missions 1, VIII Round Table on Current Problems of International
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Symposium in San Remo, Italy (Sept. 8-11, 1982)
(unpublished).
147. Id.
148. Geneva Conventions of 1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 285. The Geneva
Conventions established international "humanitarian law," applicable under condi-
tions of armed conflict. Geneva Conventions Protocol I (1977).
149. Geneva Conventions Protocol I, art. 79(1)(a).
150. For a description of "civilian status," see id. art. 50.
151. Id. art. 79(3).




carries a card. While the provision applies to a journalist on a
"professional mission," there is no attempt to define what activ-
ities meet this description. Definition is presumably left up to
the state issuing the card.
154
(b) The Helsinki Final Act
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (Final Act) was adopted on August 1, 1975 in
Helsinki, Finland.5 5 It is a massive document covering a broad
range of international issues. "Basket III" of the Final Act
deals with "Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields."
This includes specific provisions concerning the "Improvement
of Working Conditions for Journalists.' ' 5 6 The purpose of the
Conference, however, was to clarify issues of international con-
cern. 5 7 Because its purpose was to seek the greatest possible
degree of dialogue on sensitive issues, the documents emerging
from the Conference are expressly not legally binding upon
parties.5 8
As analyzed above, virtually all current international and re-
gional human rights documents contain explicit references to a
freedom of expression and/or information. However, the legal
reach of each of these individual agreements is limited, and
therefore, they fail to provide the type of freedom of the press
under international law that would bring into question the le-
gitimacy of a licensing scheme like that of the Gaborit proposal.
Provisions in the U.N. Charter lack definition. The Universal
Declaration provides definition for the Charter's reference to
freedom of expression, yet its binding nature under law is, at
best, debatable. The International Covenant is legally binding
in nature, but only upon those states which have ratified it. Re-
gional documents may be both forceful and enforceable, but
they are not international in scope.
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration proclaims, "Everyone
154. Id. art. 79(3). The state issuing the card may be the state of which the journal-
ist is a national, or resident, or in which the news medium employing the journalist is
located.
155. See T. BUERGENTHAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HEL-
SINKI AccoRD 3 (1977). The document is also known as the "Helsinki Final Act" or
the "Helsinki Accords."
156. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Basket III,
§ 2(c); T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 155, at 179-80.




has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
means and regardless of frontiers.' 15 9 This statement repre-
sents the sentiment of the founding states of the United Na-
tions and supposedly continues to represent the way nations
interpret their duty under international law. In theory, if
member states of the United Nations stand behind the Univer-
sal Declaration and the other documents in good faith, and if
they practice what the documents preach, then some form of
freedom of expression may have emerged as a rule of custom-
ary international law.
C. Have International Press Rights Become Customary Law?
At the turn of the century, the United States Supreme Court
described "the Law of Nations," or "customary" international
law, as the "customs and usages of civilized nations. '160 This
law was to be "ascertained and administered by ... courts of
justice."'' Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice defines "international custom" as "evidence of a gen-
eral practice accepted as law.
162
Under these definitions, it would seem theoretically possible
for a customary rule to emerge over time, from state practice
based on adherence to the aforementioned documents. Certain
tangible evidence can be evaluated, such as the actual number
of states adhering to each document, in order to determine the
extent of global impact and the percentage of possible adher-
ents who have assented to such rules. Such "acceptance" of the
documents' rules must be read in light of any reservations
made by the particular state at the time of ratification. 63 What
is vital is not the acceptance of the document's provisions, but
rather compliance with them as normative rules of behavior.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted
that "insofar as the expectation [of adherence to a "declara-
159. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 19 (emphasis added).
160. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
161. Id.
162. STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)(b), reprinted in 1970
Y.B.U.N. 1013. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980)
(describing the sources from which customary law is derived as "the usage of nations,
judicial opinions and the works of jurists").
163. Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/27 at 289, arts. 19-21.
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tion"] is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may
by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding
upon the States." '164 The court went on to add that "several
commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration
has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international
law." '65 It is doubtful that such a broad statement holds true, 66
though certain provisions of the Universal Declaration may
well be customary.
16 7
As for the "freedom of expression," in particular the right of
access and newsgathering, it seems doubtful that a customary
norm has yet emerged. The mere fact that repression of the
press and violence against journalists is on the rise would seem
to negate the proposition that recognition of these freedoms has
become broad-based state practice.
Despite questions as to the legal right of a free press under
international law, the continued and increasing intimidation of
journalists threatens not only their ability to seek and impart
information, but also the world population's right to receive it.
It would seem that this impediment to newsgathering poses as
great a threat to the free flow of information as might a licens-
ing program, unless some international mechanism is estab-
lished for the protection of foreign journalists.
Both the Western press organizations, which are largely
dominated by American-based newspapers and news agencies,
and the Reagan Administration claim that a program such as
Professor Gaborit proposed would be both in violation of ex-
isting norms under international law and abhorrent to the
traditional notions of a free press that are cherished as funda-
mental to a democratic society.16 Nevertheless, not only do the
existing norms under international law currently appear to
lack the strength to fully disallow such a plan, but it is also
questionable whether our own first amendment rights would
be strict enough to condemn such a practice. It is important to
examine the extent to which the U.S. Constitution has been in-
164. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 34 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 8) 15, U.N. Doc. E/cn.4/1/610 (1962) (memorandum of Office of Legal Af-
fairs, U.N. Secretariat)).
165. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883.
166. See Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
167. In fact, some scholars have said that the rule against torture may amount to a
new rule jus congens (a peremptory norm that cannot be derogated from).
168. See supra notes 56, 69 and accompanying text.
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terpreted to insure a right of press access. If the charges of the
Western Press are legally sound, the United States may violate
the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution if it becomes a
party to such a licensing scheme.
IV
Constitutionality of the Licensing Proposal-The
United States Perspective
A. Licensing and the First Amendment: An Overview
In response to the notion of international press licensing, a
New York Times editorial asserted that "it is impossible to
compromise Western standards of free expression with the cen-
sorship of states that monopolize information.' 1 69 The Reagan
Administration has followed through with its decision to with-
draw from UNESCO;1 7 0 this decision was largely based on per-
ceived attempts by UNESCO to restrict press freedom.'17  Yet,
the Reagan Administration itself denied the press any access to
witness its invasion of Grenada in 1983. Reagan justified the
news blackout by expressing concern for the safety of journal-
ists.1 72 Certainly, direct censorship is antithetical to U.S. no-
tions of freedom of the press under the first amendment, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. 7 3 While it may be true that
an international commission licensing journalists could end up
functioning as a "Board of Censors," it is questionable whether
the Gaborit proposal would amount to a form pf censorship for-
bidden by the United States Constitution.
In determining whether the proposal would compromise
United States standards of free expression, it is necessary to
determine precisely what those standards are, in light of how
the Supreme Court has defined them under the first amend-
ment. The extent to which first amendment considerations act
as a limitation on government action turns, in part, on a balanc-
ing of the nature of the "right" or "freedom" against the level
169. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1981, at 18, col. 1.
170. See supra note 10.
171. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
172. TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 65.
173. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1930) ("[L]iberty of the press ... has
meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or
censorship."). Nevertheless, at times direct censorship of other media has been al-




of the state's interest.174 If the licensing runs against first
amendment guarantees, then, arguably, the government should
not-and constitutionally could not-become a signatory to the
agreement. While a subsequent treaty (or any legally binding
international agreement) 175 can override a prior statute,176 a
treaty cannot barter away any basic constitutional
protections.
77
An examination of the licensing proposal in light of the first
amendment is necessary in order to determine whether the
United States government was justified in citing UNESCO's
press policies as one of the bases for its complete withdrawal
from that organization. In this context we must focus on the
extent to which U.S. courts recognize a protection for
newsgathering.
B. Licensing, Censoring, and Prior Restraint
Blackstone said, "To subject the press to the restrictive
power of a licenser ... is to subject all freedom of sentiment to
the prejudices of one man .... "178 Today, the Western press
argues that international licensing would subject the world's
presses to restrictions by both the international body, which
would decide who gets the licenses by choosing the criteria for
issuance,' 79 and individual dictatorships, which continue to
muzzle their own domestic press and which would not be dis-
suaded by an "identity card" from treating foreign journalists
in a similar manner.18 The "licenser" to which Blackstone re-
ferred, however, was actually a "censor," one who would decide
174. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680 (1972).
175. Regarding the legally binding nature of international "agreements" short of
formal treaties, see Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
176. For a discussion of this doctrine under U.S. law, see Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933).
177. See Reid v. Covert 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1956).
178. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 152 (T. Cooley
2d ed. 1872). See generally L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (1963).
179. For a full discussion of the Western press's analysis of the licensing proposal,
see N.Y. Times, May 18, 1981, at A14, col. 1. The newspaper article reprints the full
text of the Declaration of Talloires, adopted by the press of 20 countries in reaction to
the Gaborit licensing proposal.
180. Elie Abel, U.S. representative to the MacBride Commission, is of the opinion
that because these problems arise in countries that have little regard for any freedom
of the press, the "identity card" would offer no protection. Telephone interview with
Elie Abel (Jan. 25, 1983).
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what material could and could not be published. The focus of
this historic and now settled licensing debate in the United
States was the question of whether prior restraint on what ma-
terial could be published was a more drastic, or qualitatively
different, infringement of first amendment rights, than subse-
quent punishment for such publication.181 Since the demise of
the English license requirement in 1695,182 the Anglo-American
common law has known no all-encompassing licensing system.
Somewhat more recently, in Near v. Minnesota,8 3 the U.S.
Supreme Court said that "liberty' 4 of the press ... has meant,
principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints or censorship."'8 5 This may be an oversimplification
today, but as one commentator notes, the fear of prior restraint
lies in the fact that it more severely limits public knowledge.8 6
The Western press would seem justified in equating prior re-
straint with a licensing scheme that could serve to prevent
"nonprofessional" (i.e., nonlicensed) correspondents from gain-
ing access to the regions where news occurs. Western journal-
ists reason that the press is the people's principal vehicle for
receiving global information, that lack of access to that infor-
mation is tantamount to its suppression,187 and that "such ac-
cess is inseparable from access of the people to information.
'1 8 8
A prior restraint analysis, however, looks to the method of
restriction imposed rather than to the substance of the infor-
mation sought to be disseminated. Certainly, keeping reporters
from obtaining information in the first place is a method of re-
181. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 886 (8th
ed. 1927); J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 741 (1978), L. CANNON, REPORTING: AN
INSIDE VIEW 36 (1977).
182. Under the old English Tudor system, no material could be published without
first having been approved by the Church or secular authorities. J. NOWAK, supra
note 181, at 741.
183. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
184. Under a balancing test, a "liberty" requires only a low standard to validate a
restrictive statute. In contrast, a "fundamental freedom" or "right" would usually
require that any restrictive statute undergo strict scrutiny. See generally id
185. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added). See also N.Y. Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
186. J. NOWAK, supra note 181, at 742. Justice Black spoke of "suppression" of
information in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715-19 (Black, J.,
concurring).
187. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 710-12.




straint that occurs prior to publication. Nevertheless, the cases
in which this doctrine has been applied dealt with restraining
the publication itself.'89 Some forms of licensing have been
deemed "prior restraint" under U.S. constitutional law,190 but
these licenses regulated the dissemination of the information,
not the access to it. The Supreme Court has not dealt with the
relationship between denial of access and prior restraint.
Whether the U.S. government could legally participate in a
licensing plan like the Gaborit proposal turns on the same legal
precepts that determine whether our government could require
"permits," issued by a domestic government agency, as a pre-
requisite to press access to national news events and new-
smakers. A right of access and newsgathering under the first
amendment is far from clearly recognized. Restrictions have
been placed on domestic press access to prisons and trials.
While there is obviously a vast difference between the exercise
of government power to exclude reporters from areas tradition-
ally open to the public, such as criminal trials, and the restric-
tion of access to prisoners' cells and government files, the lines
of demarcation have not been clearly delineated by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Thus, those in other countries could argue
that the Western press and the Reagan Administration have
oversimplified the problem of press access and overstated the
degree to which newsgathering has been protected in the
United States. It appears that the American press, relying
solely on a prior restraint argument, would have difficulty
proving that the U.S. government could not validly participate
in the licensing program.
C. Access and the Right to Gather News
Western journalists speak in terms of a right of "access,"
claiming that such "access by journalists to diverse sources of
news and opinion, official or unofficial, should be without re-
striction."'1 91 In the terminology of the U.S. Supreme Court,
the notion of a right of "access" falls under the rubric of
"newsgathering."192
189. "Publication" is a legal term of art describing the dissemination of informa-
tion to the public in any form.
190. See, e.g., Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952).
191. Declaration of Talloires, supra note 188, art. 9.
192. The following discussion provides a general overview of U.S. Supreme Court
rulings touching on the right to gather news. An in-depth treatment of this topic is
(Vol. 7
No. 1] LICENSING OF JOURNALISTS
In Branzburg v. Hayes,193 the Court acknowledged that
"news gathering is not without its First Amendment protec-
tions. ' 194 However, the extent to which newsgathering is a pro-
tected right under the first amendment is far from a settled
point of law.195  Although Justice White's plurality opinion in
Branzburg brought newsgathering under the first amendment
umbrella, it denied that this protection gave the press any "con-
stitutional right of special access to information not available to
the public generally."' 96 In dictum, he continued, "The right to
speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
to gather information.'
' 97
The status of the right of newsgathering remained vague af-
ter Branzburg.198 Six years later, in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily,199 the Court again found that the societal interests in law
enforcement outweighed the newspaper's first amendment
rights in the sanctity of its photographic files.2°° The newspa-
per argued unsuccessfully that freedom from police intrusion
was an integral part of its newsgathering and dissemination
beyond the scope of this commentary. See Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERs L. REV. 173,
176-82 (1979); Stevens, Some Thoughts About a General Rule, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 599,
602-03 (1979); Comment, Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 53 TEx. L. REV. 1440 (1975); Note, The Rights of the Public and the
Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
193. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
194. Id. at 707. See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859 (1974)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
195. In Branzburg, the rights the Court seemed to give with one hand, it restricted
with the other. The issue was whether journalists had a right to protect confidential
sources in the face of a grand jury subpoena. Forced disclosure of sources was consid-
ered by the reporters to be an indirect obstruction to newsgathering, discouraging
these and other potential informants from confiding in them in the future.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
196. Id. at 684 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
197. Id Justice White cited as examples the fact that "[n]ewsmen have no consti-
tutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is
excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about
trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an
impartial tribunal." Id. at 684-85.
White found that the public interest in "pursuing," "prosecuting" and thus "deter-
ring" crimes could not be superseded by the public interest in possible future news
about crimes. Id.
198. Id. at 709. Unlike Justice White, Justice Powell felt that the newsman's privi-
lege issue should be tried on a case-by-case basis. Powell also would expressly limit
the holding to the narrow case of subpoenas to a grand jury. Id. at 710.
199. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
200. In Zurcher, a valid search warrant was enough to give police the right to
search the offices of Stanford's student newspaper, and the paper had no constitu-
tional right to protest the search ahead of time. Id. at 567.
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functions.20 1
The legal status of newsgathering under the U.S. Constitu-
tion is even more uncertain if one charts the course of Justice
Stewart's opinions. In Branzburg, he was critical of the plural-
ity's "disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of an independ-
ent press in our society." He felt that the decision would
"impair performance of the press' constitutionally protected
functions. '20 2 He seemed dissatisfied with holding the press to
the same testimony requirements that we place on the general
public. Yet two years later, writing for the majority in both
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 20 3 and Pell v. Procunier,20 4 Stew-
art seemed to make a complete about-face. These companion
cases examined the constitutionality of state and federal prison
regulations denying reporters face-to-face interviews with indi-
vidual prisoners upon request. Following Branzburg's recogni-
tion that there is some measure of first amendment status for
newsgathering, the press had begun to test the scope of this
right. Lower courts were split as to whether direct governmen-
tal restraints on newsgathering were violative of the first
amendment.20 5 In Saxbe and Pell, the Supreme Court sought to
address the access issue head-on and clarify some of the con-
flicting language in the Branzburg plurality and concurring
opinions.2" This time, Stewart seemed less worried about im-
pairing the performance of the press. He found that "newsmen
have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their in-
mates beyond that afforded the general public. ' 207  He ex-
plained his seeming change of opinion by noting that the
reporter-inmate interview would impose an "affirmative duty"
upon the government to make available sources not otherwise
accessible to the public.208 It would appear that the Court at-
201. Id. at 563.
202. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
203. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
204. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
205. Comment, supra note 192, at 1447 (1975). For examples of the split among
lower courts, see, e.g., Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d
1062 (9th Cir. 1973); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork, 370 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Mass.), rev'd,
503 F.2d 1396 (1st Cir. 1974); Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
206. Comment, supra note 192, at 1447. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork the court
noted that despite much conflicting language between the concurring opinions in
Branzburg, all nine justices agreed that newsgathering was afforded some degree of
constitutional protection. Globe Newspaper, 370 F. Supp. at 1337 n.4.
207. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834.
208. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834. Justice Powell, dissenting in
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tempted to avoid dealing directly with the complex problem of
applying the first amendment to the various "newsgathering"
methods.
One commentator, in attempting to unravel Stewart's opin-
ions, felt that in Branzburg, Stewart acknowledged a press
right to "seek the news without official interference in the pro-
cess," while in Pell and Saxbe, he denied that this right ex-
tended to obtaining government-held information "against the
government's wishes."20 9
This analysis seems to have guided the Court's reasoning in
Houchins v. KQED.21 0 In Houchins, Chief Justice Burger, writ-
ing for the majority, concluded that "[n]either the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right
of access to government information or sources of information
within the government's control."21' Citing Pell and Saxbe, he
denied a "special right of access" for the press. 1 2
More recently, the pendulum has apparently swung back
into a more favorable position for the press-at least in the par-
ticular context of press access to criminal trials. In Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia,"3 the Court held that both the press
and the general public have a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials, "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in
findings. 21 4 In Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court,1 the
Court invalidated a statutory mandatory-closure rule during
testimony of underage rape victims. The overriding first
amendment interest called for a case-by-case form of evalua-
tion prior to closure.1 6 Yet, despite these recent acknowledg-
ments of first amendment rights in the trial setting, Pell, Saxbe,
and Houchins remain valid restrictions on press access to gov-
ernment controlled information. These opinions evidence that
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862, found Justice Stewart's news perspective to be a sweeping de-
nial of the "societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discus-
sion of government affairs." Powell again called for a balancing of the societal
interest in a free flow of information against a legitimate governmental concern, in
this case effective administration of penal facilities.
209. Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFsTRA L. REV. 595, 624-25
(1979) (emphasis added).
210. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
211. Id. at 15.
212. Id. at 15-16.
213. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
214. Id. at 581.
215. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
216. Id. at 608.
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the concept of a right of newsgathering under the first amend-
ment remains unclear.
If the highest court of the United States holds that even the
first amendment press freedom does not create any access
rights when the information sought is physically within that
government's control, then what credibility would the United
States have in arguing for free access to events or regions held
under dictatorial control in a foreign country? On what au-
thority could the American press deny the constitutionality of a
treaty that would allow foreign governments to deny access to
government controlled information by licensed journalists, or
to revoke those licenses when the journalists intended to inves-
tigate the government's sphere of domination? When it hap-
pens that the government in question is a dictatorship or a
military junta with an entire country essentially lying under its
control, the denial of access to government controlled informa-
tion can effectively deny press access to all political and mili-
tary events.
V
Newsgathering, Access, and the Liberty to Travel
A. The International View
The licensing of international journalists could affect their
ability to travel to and from foreign countries. The license,
granting access, can always be revoked.
Despite the fact that both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights grant "everyone" the right to "seek" informa-
tion "regardless of frontiers,"21' a sovereign state has a great
deal of control over the entry and exit of foreigners; it can re-
quire special visas for entry, limit or terminate their stay, and
regulate immigration.21 These rights of regulation stem from
the concept of the sovereignty of the independent state,219 the
217. See Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 19; International Covenant,
supra note 38, art. 19.
218. See J. NOWAK, supra note 181, at 666-68. See, e.g., the United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act (INA). The INA is representative of the breadth of regu-
lation to which modern states subject foreign citizens seeking temporary or
permanent residence.
219. For a description of the political/historical meaning of sovereignty see R. AL-
BRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
5 (1958). "Sovereignty, by its very nature, means the denial of any higher authority
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foundation of our international system since the rise of the na-
tion-state.220 No international license can supersede the sover-
eign's power to police its own border with regard to foreign
entry.
221
Under international law, the entry and exit of foreigners is
treated differently than that of the state's own citizens. The
Universal Declaration states that "[e]veryone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his coun-
try. '222 While even foreigners are guaranteed a right to leave
once legally within a state,223 no guarantee of initial entry is
suggested.224
B. The U.S. View: Americans Traveling Abroad
Even when foreign governments are willing to admit Ameri-
can journalists, the U.S. government has, on occasion, imposed
passport restrictions denying any American citizen, including
reporters, the right to travel to those countries. A journalist
who violates such restrictions may have his passport revoked.
This situation can be construed as a further indication that the
.... .Albrecht-Carrie, however, takes an extremely traditional and restrictive view
of the sovereignty of independent states. In his view, "the very phrase, 'an interna-
tional organization of sovereign states' involves a contradiction if it is meant to imply
an organization with laws." Id. n.5. He adds that "it must ever be borne in mind that
international law ... does not rest on the same basis as ordinary law for the simple
reason that no enforcing agency can. . . exist among sovereigns." Id. at 6. Yet this
disregards the limited grants of power (or power transfers) from states to such supra-
national organizations as the U.N. and the EEC. Albrecht-Carrie's perspective also
disregards the premise of the majority of international legal scholars-the premise
upon which this commentary is based-that law exists as positivistic norms, or rules
guiding behavior, irrespective of the mechanisms for enforcement.
220. The Treaty of Westphalia at the close of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, is
usually cited as Europe's formal introduction to the modern sovereign state system.
Id. at 4.
221. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "the power to exclude aliens is inher-
ent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and de-
fending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers ... " Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
222. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 13(2) (emphasis added). See also In-
ternational Covenant, supra note 38, arts. 12, 13, at 54-55; American Convention,
supra note 85, at 1. See also 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 123 (1970).
223. International Covenant, supra note 38, art. 12(1), at 54.
224. International human rights live in a system of sovereign states, and gov-
ernments have not been willing to recognize a human right of persons in
other countries to come to their country; there is not even, as yet, a recog-
nized right of asylum for those who are oppressed and have become refugees.
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 88, at 19.
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U.S. government does not give high priority to the American
press's physical access to foreign news events.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly decided a case con-
cerning the restriction or denial of a journalist's passport,
though such a denial was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Worthy v. Herter.225 In Worthy,
a reporter's passport was not renewed after he violated pass-
port restrictions by traveling in certain communist countries.
The court acknowledged that "[t]he right to travel is a part of
the right to liberty, and a newspaperman's right to travel is part
of the freedom of the press. ' 226 The court, however, applied a
balancing test to decide the case, and held that because
"[1]iberty itself is inherently a restricted thing"227 and a "news-
man's freedom to travel about is ... subject to myriad limita-
tions,' '228 the reporter's interest in access to those lands was
outweighed by the executive power to conduct foreign
affairs.
229
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt with journalists'
travel in particular, the trend seems to be toward a restrictive
view of the right to travel internationally.230  In Zemel v.
Rusk 231 the appellant sought, unsuccessfully, to have his pass-
port validated for an "informational" tour of Cuba. Congress
had passed a narrowly circumscribed bill prohibiting travel to
Cuba. The United States had broken diplomatic and consular
relations with that country. 32 In upholding the Secretary of
State's denial, the Court repeated the refrain, "[t]he right to
speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
225. 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
226. Id. at 908.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 910.
230. This trend is marked by the progression of the following cases: Kent v. Dul-
les, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (holding that the right to travel at home and abroad is an
important liberty, which cannot be restricted without due process of law); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding that the revocation of a passport was
invalid because Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 was uncon-
stitutional and too broadly transgressed the rights guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (holding that the government restrictions on
travel to Cuba were justified by the important considerations of national security);
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (holding that the right to hold a passport is
subordinate to national security considerations and is subject to reasonable govern-
mental regulation).
231. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
232. Id. at 3-4.
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to gather information."2 ' The Court agreed that the govern-
ment's action was a restriction of the free flow of information
concerning Cuba, but that this was one factor among many "to
be considered in determining whether appellant has been de-
nied due process of law.
23 4
In its latest word on the subject in Haig v. Agee,235 the Court
contrasted the freedom to travel internationally with interstate
travel rights: "The constitutional right of interstate travel is
virtually unqualified. By contrast the 'right' of international
travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. As such this 'right' can be regulated ....
C. The U.S. View: Foreigners Bearing Ideas
Unfortunately, some governments limit the entry of journal-
ists in order to block global scrutiny of internal inequities, in-
justices, and, in some cases, atrocities, and thereby restrict the
free flow of information. The flow of information from abroad,
however, has also been impeded when our own government has
restricted access to foreign persons bearing information and
ideas from abroad. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,237 the Supreme
Court acknowledged "a first amendment right to 'receive infor-
mation and ideas,' ",238 but bowed to executive discretion in de-
nying a nonimmigrant visa to a Belgian Trotskyist journalist
and scholar.239 Noting the issues of foreign policy and national
security, the Court would not second-guess the Executive
branch's discretion, "nor test it by balancing its justification
against the First Amendment interests of those who seek per-
sonal communication with the [visa] applicant. '24 ° Thus, the
233. Id. at 17 (holding that the first amendment was not an issue as the govern-
ment was restricting action, not speech).
234. Id. The constitutionally protected right to travel within the United States
does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence cannot be quar-
antined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would
directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or
the Nation as a whole. So it is with international travel.
Id. at 15, 16.
235. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
236. Id. at 307 (citing Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978)).
237. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
238. Id. at 762.
239. Id. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Mandel had been invited to attend confer-
ences at both Stanford and MIT, and to lecture at various eastern universities.
240. Id. at 770. Justice Marshall, dissenting, felt that this exclusion was not validly
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first amendment "right ... to know" 2 4 1 was overshadowed by
the broad power of Executive branch discretion in the interna-
tional arena.
242
D. In Summation: Licensing in the Constitutional Context
Was the New York Times editorial correct when it asserted
that "it is impossible to compromise Western standards of free
expression"?
243
It is true that it is "impossible," in a sense, for the U.S. gov-
ernment to conclude a treaty or an executive agreement 244 that
does not comply with protections of the Constitution.2 45 "It
would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution ... to permit the United States to ex-
ercise power under an international agreement without observ-
ing constitutional prohibitions 24 and guarantees. But upon
close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the constitutional stan-
dards of free expression are not clearly delineated where new-
sgathering is concerned. The restrictions placed by the
Supreme Court upon news investigation, access to information,
and travel demonstrate that this is a gray area. The ease with
based on a compelling governmental interest and, hence, did not outweigh the first
amendment interests involved. Id. at 778-79.
241. Id. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
242. "It is settled that in respect to foreign affairs the President has the power of
action and the courts will not attempt to review the merits of what he does. The
President is the nation's organ in and for foreign affairs." Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d
at 911.
243. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1981, at 18, col. 1 (emphasis added).
244. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("[A]n international
compact ... is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate.").
The Court went on to describe U.S. international obligations as being virtually the
same whether stemming from a valid treaty or executive agreement.
245. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957). Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
distinguished Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), on the ground that the treaty in
that case "was not inconsistent with any specific provisions of the Constitution." Hol-
land dealt with "the Tenth Amendment which reserves to the states... all power
not delegated to the National Government." 354 U.S. at 18. Under the treaty-making
power of Article VI, the people have so delegated that power to the Executive and
Congress.
246. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-17. In the intranational setting, the Executive's treaty/
foreign affairs power is, in general, broader than congressional legislative powers.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). In international dealings, the Executive
is allowed broad discretionary powers with regard to foreign policy matters, but both
treaties and statutes are still subordinate to an individual's constitutionally granted
rights. See also J. HILDEBRAND, SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1968) ("Congress'
power to implement a treaty obligation of the United States does not permit Congress
to legislate in violation of established Constitutional guarantees.").
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which the Executive branch denied the American press access
to report on U.S. military action in Grenada bears witness to
this fact.247
When considered along with the acknowledged "right to
know," the lack of a constitutional right to gather information
seems rather ironic. As one commentator has noted, "Just at
the moment when freedom to express opinion has become
fairly well established, the need for factual information has be-
come vastly more important .... Now we are free to com-
ment, but the facts are hard to find. ' 248 The public's right to
know depends upon the press's right to gather information.
The press's right of access is, under many conditions, no greater
than that allotted to the public. Thus, because the individual
citizen is no more likely to travel to foreign countries to "check
out conditions on the outside" than he or she is likely to inter-
view individual prisoners to gain a perspective on "conditions
on the inside," the public's right to know has been effectively
circumscribed by the constitutional limits to the press's right of
access.
It appears that the Gaborit licensing proposal would not nec-
essarily violate the U.S. Constitution's first amendment and
due process provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court.249
Were such a proposal to have been adopted by UNESCO, the
U.S. could have legally become a party to it. Thus, it appears
that the Reagan Administration's decision to pull out of
UNESCO turned more on issues of policy and politics than on
the legal question of press freedoms under either international




In light of the foregoing discussion, it would not appear to be
a direct violation of any established norm or multinational
treaty if UNESCO tried to implement the licensing proposal.
Yet, it does seem to be very much a violation of the spirit of the
247. See TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 65-66.
248. Rembar, The First Amendment on Trial, 231 ATL. MONTHLY 47, 48 (Apr.
1973).
249. The due process argument is one often advanced in conjunction with the
"freedom of movement/travel" cases. See, e.g., supra note 230 and cases cited therein.
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"freedom of expression" enshrined in Article 19 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and the other international
documents. Even the MacBride Commission was unwilling to
officially endorse-or even recognize-a proposal to establish
press controls.25 ° More importantly, it is unlikely that such an
"identity" card would protect journalists in countries currently
allowing (or initiating) violence against foreign correspondents.
Eight or nine countries in Latin America currently enforce li-
censing of domestic journalists. 251 Though foreign journalists
are generally exempt from these licensing requirements, 52
they are often dependent upon the domestic press for much of
their information.25 ' Even if an identity card gave protections
to foreign correspondents, it would offer no solution for the do-
mestic press in those countries.
If the licensing proposal is ineffective and antithetical to the
spirit of free expression, then some other protection must be
provided to correspondents who seek information-and thereby
contribute to the flow of information-across frontiers.
B. The Possibilities
None of the proposals below offer an all-encompassing insur-
ance of protection. But each represents a concrete step in the
right direction. If implemented in toto, there is a good chance
that they will have a significant impact on the problem of vio-
lence. Over time, adherence to such practices could herald in a
new "customary" freedom for the global press.
1. 'Article 19 Committee"
One commentator has suggested the formation of an "Article
19 Committee" that would be an independent, international,
nongovernmental organization modeled after Amnesty Inter-
national and the International Red Cross.2 ' The purpose of
this organization would be "to investigate, take legal action and
250. See MacBride Report, supra note 13; Telephone interview with Elie Abel,
supra note 180.
251. Telephone interview with Elie Abel, supra note 180.
252. One example of this exception is the case of a North American journalist
working for a Costa Rican newspaper without a degree from the correct state-desig-
nated "collegio." Telephone interview with Elie Abel, supra note 180.
253. This is especially true of American journalists who are often untrained in lo-
cal customs and/or language.




publicize violation" of the rights outlined in Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.255
Under this proposal, investigations of violations would be
conducted either by national volunteers, or by representatives
of the Committee who would travel to that country for an on-
site investigation. Legal action would take place on the na-
tional or local level,256 as well as by petition to the various in-
ternational mechanisms. 57 The group would rely heavily on
volunteer attorneys and on journalists' organizations.
Such a group would likely receive a great deal of resistance
from national authorities. This resistance could be circum-
vented by the fact that "the committee is truly international in
its composition," and thus, presumably, neutral, that it is "com-
mitted to established and declared international principles,"
and that such a group could focus "the strong light of interna-
tional publicity" on violators.2 -
There are certain problems inherent in this proposal as it is
currently articulated. Unlike the International Committee of
the Red Cross, such a group would not be comprised strictly of
citizens of neutral, nonaligned states.259 Also, the work of the
Red Cross is focused on implementation of the Geneva Conven-
tions and Protocol I-binding international documents, which
embody many now-customary norms of wartime conduct. An
"Article 19 Committee" would seek to implement nonbinding
principles based on the Universal Declaration. Though these
may be established principles, they are not customary. The
provisions of the International Covenant do not, for example,
bind the United States.26  The analogy to Amnesty Interna-
255. Id. at 5.
256. Id.
257. These mechanisms include the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-
national Labor Organization, UNESCO, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, and others. However, both the Red Cross and Amnesty International are
readily distinguishable from Professor Anawalt's model. The Red Cross is completely
nonpartisan, in that all members of the International Committee arm of the organiza-
tion (its political arm) must be Swiss citizens. (Switzerland is a politically neutral,
nonaligned country.) Also, the Geneva Conventions are more readily enforceable and
more broadly followed than are provisions similar to Article 19. The Article 19 Com-
mittee could be better compared with Amnesty International. Yet, Amnesty Interna-
tional's work, which encompasses all forms of human rights violations and not just
those against the press, would seem to have a wider appeal to the general population.
258. H. Anawalt, supra note 254, at 5.
259. See supra note 257.
260. The United States, as noted previously, has not ratified the International Cov-
enant. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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tional is more apt. The focus of inquiry would be more particu-
larized, but the mechanics for policing that particular human
right would be patterned after Amnesty International's suc-
cessful techniques." 1 The use of publicity to focus world atten-
tion on abuses would come easily to the press-related
organization. Nevertheless, questions of possible bias could
arise.
One major problem exists with the application of these estab-
lished "human rights" techniques: they are applied only after
the alleged violations have occurred. While they may ulti-
mately be successful in freeing or even saving an individual
journalist, they remain at best piecemeal solutions. The estab-
lishment of an "Article 19 Committee" would certainly be a
step in the right direction, but it is not likely to melt the "chil-
ling effect" that the widespread threat of violence and other
forms of reprisal have on the work of the foreign
correspondent.6 2
2. Networks of Bilateral Treaties
It would appear to be difficult for governments to neglect
their obligations under a bilateral treaty. When only two states
are parties to an agreement, the two governments will scruti-
nize each other's actions with more dedication than any third
party, nongovernmental organization ever could. Thus, bilat-
eral treaties and agreements provide an effective, though lim-
ited, mechanism for enforcing press freedoms. In certain
instances, such agreements have proven effective between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R.263 With vastly different interpretations of
the general "freedom of expression," the implementation of
general declaratory principles can end up leading to much de-
bate and little action. Yet, these two divergent regimes have
managed to make several provisions of the Helsinki Final Act
reciprocally binding between them. In particular, agreements
have been concluded regarding (1) multiple entry-exit visas for
journalists, (2) travel restrictions and (3) reciprocity in the
opening of foreign offices-United Press in Leningrad, TASS in
261. Amnesty International seeks to remain an international, neutral entity, inves-
tigating conditions within countries and mobilizing world opinion as its coercive
power.
262. See CPJ, Statement of Journalists' Mission to Central America (Apr. 1, 1982).




In sum, bilateral agreements provide an effective method of
insuring legally binding and enforceable protections. These
provisions can be embodied in "reciprocal treatment
clauses.
'2 65
3. Training: "Ethics"from Within
Professional training for foreign correspondents, in combina-
tion with a revamping of internal codes of ethics, could expe-
dite movement toward the dual goals of protecting journalists
and improving the depth, breadth, and accuracy of foreign news
coverage. This suggestion is aimed at the U.S. press in particu-
lar. American newspapers are notorious for sending "general-
ists" abroad.26 The simplistic logic behind this practice is the
belief that a "specialist," one trained in the language and cus-
toms of the nation to which he or she has been assigned, will
write above the heads of his or her readership. Thus, newspa-
pers typically send untrained persons and move them after ap-
proximately two years. The result is not only superficial, and
often biased, reporting, but potential physical danger to the un-
wary journalist. Responsible newspapers should consider
amending their codes of ethics to require that a level of lan-
guage proficiency and cultural knowledge be attained by a re-
porter prior to foreign assignment.
If mechanisms such as these are instituted and enforced, con-
crete steps can be taken toward the protection of foreign jour-
nalists. These provisions can be enforced without violating the
spirit of the right to seek, receive and impart information. Per-
haps over time, such practices will contribute to a customary,




The UNESCO proposal to license international correspon-
dents and to regulate their behavior by requiring adherence to
an international code of ethics has caused an uproar in the
264. T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 155, at 145-47.
265. Reciprocal treatment clauses provide that the terms in question must apply in
the reverse situation (i.e., "treat us as we treat you").
266. L. CANNON. REPORTING: AN INSIDE VIEW 126 (1977).
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Western-particularly, American-press. It has been chal-
lenged as antithetical to both an established international tradi-
tion of "a free flow of information" and the first amendment's
guarantee of "freedom of the press." Under international law,
the journalist's contribution to the free flow of information has
been denoted in several human rights instruments as the free-
dom "to seek" information.
This right, however, like those guaranteed by the first
amendment, is subject to a myriad of limitations. Some docu-
ments are not legally binding upon any state. Some agree-
ments allow the state to decline to grant a right of access. Some
are legally enforceable, but affect only a small number of states
in a particular region. Some are only activated in times of war.
At the present time it is doubtful that the freedom of expres-
sion provisions have become "customary" norms. Repeated
patterns of violence against journalists would seem to negate
the "state practice" requirement.
Yet, despite the limited nature of legal protections currently
available under international law, the freedom of expression
can and should be preserved and expanded, not only because it
embodies the spirit of the "free flow of information" necessary
for an enlightened and politically aware world population, but
because a competent, reliable, sensitive, and perceptive press
can help foster understanding among cultures. Such protec-
tions can exist without creating a governmental or regulatory
commission that may infringe on press freedoms. Options such
as the "Article 19 Committee," the treaty network, and re-
vamped internal codes of ethics exist as viable, voluntary alter-
natives for those who are concerned with the continuing
tragedy and seek to reverse the trend.
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